I am writing to address the contentious question of the classification of depression. The American Psychiatric Association's classification system takes a dimensional approach to the classification of depression. Essentially this creates a spectrum from mild to severe forms of depression with the assumption that a patient will move to some point along that dimension as they become more unwell and move back along that dimension as they recover. An alternative approach to the classification of depression is a category model in which the symptoms of the condition, or perhaps the type of depression, are on a separate axis to the severity of the condition. Consequently, a patient may have a mild to severe form of each category of depression but not necessarily the propensity to move from one category to another. I believe that this is important because the assumption that all forms of depression can be treated by different types of treatment, irrespective of the type of depression, can lead to an inappropriate treatment for a particular category.
In order to settle the issue it occurs to me that, if instances could be found where patients suffer a category of depression which may move from mild to severe but do not move through other categories of depression, this would argue strongly in favour of a category model as opposed to a dimensional model in which a patient might be expected to move from a mild form to a severe form and then reverse in recovery. It would be interesting if readers of this journal were able to produce case histories of patients who, for example, might suffer psychotic depression and go from being well into psychotic depression without necessarily proceeding through dysthymic or non-melancholic forms of depression and conversely, recover from this category of depression without moving along the dimensions. Similarly, readers may be able to identify patients who move straight into a melancholic form of depression and, likewise, revert out of the melancholic form without necessarily proceeding through other phases of the dimension. There are certainly individuals that I believe fulfil these criteria and if so, it would argue strongly in favour of the category form and consequently against a dimensional approach to the classification of depression. The dimensional models underpinning both recent DSM and ICD systems assume that depression is an entity varying dimensionally, most commonly by severity but allowing other dimensional parameters (e.g. duration, recurrence and persistence). Our Black Dog Institute model [1] assumes that there are two categorical types of depression (i.e. psychotic and melancholic depression) definable by the presence of two specific clinical features and that there is a third heterogeneous residual class of non-melancholic depressive disorders. Our model assumes that the depressive mood disorder is ubiquitous across the three classes, albeit (in general terms) increasing in severity from non-melancholic to melancholic and, in turn, to psychotic depression. Melancholic depression is distinguished by a specific additional component (i.e. observable psychomotor disturbance, or PMD) which (again in general terms) is even more severe in psychotic depression (but here, the class specifying clinical feature is the presence of delusions and/or hallucinations). To reduce confounding, our model assumes that individuals must have a primary diagnosis of depression and that they are at, or near to, the nadir of that particular episode.
Reply to James Greenwood
Ours is akin to Fould's 'inclusive non-reflexive' hierarchical model [2] , but perhaps better viewed as a recruitment model, in that we argue that the depressed patients occupying the higher classes must have the features of the lower class (i.e. those with psychotic depression must also have PMD and a depressed mood and those with melancholia must have a depressed mood). The 'recruitment' model effectively posits that certain processes underpin the mood disorder and that additional processes underpin the PMD and psychotic feature components, rather than view the latter as determined merely by any greater severity of the mood component drivers.
Jim Greenwood is perhaps arguing for a strong test of any model (i.e. refutability of the hypothesis), although movement in and out of the disorder episode does not strike me as central and could be a major study confounder. Representative samples would be needed for testing rather than mere selection of an 'exception to the rule'. Any such study might best involve determining if 'psychotic depression' exists without PMD and mood disturbance. I would be suspicious that such patients would be more likely to have schizophrenia or a psychotic condition other than psychotic depression -but this is testable. It would also require determining if melancholia ever existed without PMD. This is less readily testable as there is 'Melancholia' and 'melancholia'. While we have argued that PMD is a 'necessary and sufficient' feature of melancholia [3] , it is only one of eight DSM-IV criteria features, with those decision rules allowing melancholia to be diagnosed in the absence of PMD. There is now substantial evidence to suggest that the increased risk of violence found in people with schizophrenia [1] is unlikely to be mediated entirely by the effect of acute symptoms [2] . Other more enduring factors such as neurocognitive deficits [3] , social impoverishment [4] and personality dysfunction [5] are also relevant.
Schizophrenia, genes and violence
It is therefore unfortunate that the study by Koen et al. [6] used a narrow criterion for violence by limiting their focus to aggressive acts occurring around the time of acute relapse. The resulting negative finding with respect to putative genetic risk factors is unsurprising. By using this criterion, the study is inevitably skewed in favour of finding factors (such as delusions of control and substance abuse) that relate to that subset of violent acts directly driven by psychotic symptoms.
It is entirely possible that violence among patients with schizophrenia at times when they are not floridly unwell does bear some relationship to variations in genes regulating amine metabolism, which may affect, for example, impulse control. The impact of such variations however, may be too subtle to be evident in the acute situation where the effects of delusions and substance-induced mental state changes may result in a 'ceiling effect' with respect to violence risk.
A similar investigation on a community sample, examining violence over a prolonged period of time, may be more fruitful.
